Child Support

Published on: February 10, 2020

When Considering A Child Support Modification the Court Will Consider Factors Other than Voluntary Job Loss – Vetrano v. Vetrano, 2019 NY Slip Op 8415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case, upon divorce, the mother was awarded sole custody of the couple’s child and the father was ordered to pay child support. After losing his job, the father requested a reduction in child support payments. His request was denied by the Support Magistrate.

In New York the court will consider modification in child support if at least 3 years have passed since the original order, if income of either parent has changed by at least 15%, or if there has been some other change of circumstances. Family Court Act § 451(3)(b). One reason that a parent’s income would decrease is a loss of job. There have been instances in which parents have actually quit their jobs or intentionally contributed to the loss of their jobs in order to get out of paying child support. That will not work in New York. The obligation to pay child support and a child support order will not be modified if a parent job loss was due to his or her own actions. Furthermore, even if the job loss was involuntary, the parent is required to diligently seek another job. If not, then the court will not consider a modification of the child support order and in will be imputed.

In Vetrano v. Vetrano, the father petitioned the court for a downward modification, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from his job and that he was not able to find comparable employment. As a result, his income decreased more than 15% from the date of the original child support order, which was more than three years ago. In addition, the father alleged that the mother’s income had increased by more than 15%. On its face, the father’s petition presented a prima facie case of changed circumstances such that a downward modification in child support was warranted. However, the Support Magistrate dismissed the father’s petition concluding that the father had not shown that the loss of his job was not his own fault and that he had been diligently searching for a new job. When the Family Court denied the father’s objections to the Support Magistrate’s decision, the father appealed to the Supreme Court.

Published on: January 20, 2020

Custodial Interference Can Be the Basis for Suspending the Obligation to Pay Child Support – Katz v. Katz, 2008 NY Slip Op 7873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

by Stephen Bilkis

In Katz v. Katz, the Appellate Division considered whether a father’s obligation to pay child support could be suspended because the mother interfered with his visitation.

The general rule is that under New York law a noncustodial parent’s access to a child and his or her obligation to pay child support are separate issues. The court can require a parent to pay child support and also deny the parent visitation. If a custodial parent refuses to allow the noncustodial parent access to the child, the noncustodial parent should petition the court for custody or visitation. If there is a custody or visitation order in place and the custodial parent does not allow the noncustodial parent access to the child as required by the order, then the custodial parent is violating a court order. The aggrieved parent should take up the matter with Family Court. The remedy is not for the noncustodial parent to simply withhold child support. If the custodial parent is willfully interfering with visitation, upon petition the court may suspend or even cancel the noncustodial parent’s obligation to pay child support.

In Katz v. Katz, upon the couple’s divorce, the mother was awarded physical custody of the couple’s children. The father was awarded visitation. The father was also ordered to pay child support in the amount of $10,000 per month. The father petitioned the court to suspend his obligation to pay child support because the mother was not permitting him to have access to the children as required by the custody order. He also requested a recoupment of the child support that he had already paid. In support of his petition the father alleged multiple incidents in which the mother interfered with his parenting time and denied him telephone contact with the children. The mother responded by filing a motion to dismiss.

Published on: December 8, 2019

Visitation Interference May Result in Suspension of Child Support Obligation – Vasquez v. Powell, 111 A.D.3d 754 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case the Family Court considered whether interference with visitation was a reason to stop paying child support and whether it would cancel child support arrears. The father was awarded custody of the child and the mother visitation. The mother was also required to pay child support to the father. She complained that the father was not complying with the visitation schedule. She argued that she should not have to pay child support if she was not getting access to the child as outlined in the custody order.

The court takes interference with visitation very seriously. When the court issues a custody order, both parents must follow it. This means that the custodial parent must deliver the child to the non-custodial parent at the time and place agreed upon. Willful failure to do so is illegal. If this happens occasionally, the court will likely only chastise the parent and warn him or her to comply with the order. If it happens repeatedly, the court will view it as willful and take steps to ensure that the order is followed. One remedy may be suspending the obligation of the non-custodial parent to pay child support.

In Vasquez, the mother filed a petition to hold the father in civil contempt for violating an order of visitation. As part of the relief sought, the mother requested that her obligation to pay child support be suspended. She also requested that the court cancel her child support arrears. While the court noted that it has the discretion to suspend child support payments for violations of an order of visitation, it also made it clear that the court would not have the authority to cancel arrearages. It further noted that in this case there was no evidence that the father actively interfered with the mother’s visitation. The evidence showed that at times the child did not want to take advantage of the scheduled visitation, and the father did not force the child.

Published on: April 24, 2019

Party Seeks Credit of Child Support for Education Expenses

by Stephen Bilkis

KG v G

NY Slip Op 04278

Pursuant to Section 50011 of the Rules, this case was affirmed with costs. Much like the appellate opinion and in consideration of a substantial downward departure from support set out in the Child Support Standards Act, this court can’t say the Supreme Court was in error. Before incorporating the party’s agreement into a judgement, it addressed the provision in question in the framework of a larger agreement and each of the party’s respective finances in a way that secured adequate child support for each child, as the parties originally intended (Domestic Relations Law 240 (1-b[h]). Judges Difiore, Fahey, Rivera, Wilson and Feinman concur. Judge Stien offered his dissent and Judge Garcia agrees.

Published on: May 1, 2018

Matter of FF v FF

by Stephen Bilkis

2018 NY Slip Op. 02781

April 25, 2018

Decision

Published on: May 15, 2017

Sanders v. Sanders

by Stephen Bilkis

2017 NY Slip Op 03549

May 3, 2017

Decision

Published on: April 9, 2017

Kashman v Kashman

by Stephen Bilkis

2017 NY Slip Op 01343

February 22, 2017

Decision

Published on: March 14, 2017

Court Rules on a Sister State Divorce Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

This case involves the enforcement of a sister-state divorce judgment, with respect to arrears in alimony and support payments, pursuant to the ‘Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act’ (article 54 of the CPLR) brought before the Supreme Court, Special Term.

Sometime in Junuary 1973, the plaintiff-wife commenced an action for divorce in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut where she was then living and has continued to reside with her two minor children. On 16 April 1973, while the action was pending, the parties executed a separation agreement – semimonthly payments to the plaintiff for alimony and child support, among others. Thereafter, the plaintiff was granted a judgment of absolute divorce by the Connecticut court, specifically incorporating the terms of the separation agreement, the agreement surviving and not merging into the decree.

Defendant resided in Manhattan when the separation agreement was executed, and in Brooklyn when the divorce judgment was granted. There is no question of the defendant appearing in and being represented by counsel in the divorce action. Defendant currently lives in Brooklyn and is a practicing veterinarian.

Published on: March 12, 2017

Bitic v Bitic

by Stephen Bilkis

2017 NY Slip Op 01529

March 1, 2017

The appellate court affirms the judgment.

Published on: August 12, 2016

Court Decides Authority of Probation Officers

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, the petitioners, Probation Officers with permanent status in the Nassau County Probation Department, question the authority of the respondent, as the State Administrator of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York to exercise jurisdiction over the examinations for positions in the Probation Department and the reasonableness of the eligibility requirements fixed by him for the promotion examination that was to be conducted on November 18, 1967 for the position of Supervising Probation Officer.

Specifically, petitioners urge: that the Nassau County Probation Department is not a part of the unified court system of the State of New York; that the reduction in eligibility requirements for candidates from those specified in Exhibit B (Nassau County Civil Service Commission notice of examination dated December 15, 1962) to those specified in Exhibit A (announcement for written test on November 18, 1967 of Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference) so that persons with less experience and training would be eligible, would result in placing supervision in the hands of persons who were not qualified, and would increase from 36 to 80 the number of probation officers eligible to take the examination.

Examination of the papers submitted and of the law satisfied the Court that the Administrative Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter and that it was not unreasonable for it, through its administrator, to adopt the requirements for the position as revealed in Exhibit A.