Articles Posted in Nassau

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This is a condemnation proceeding in which the Village of Garden City sought to acquire title in fee to certain property within the village for a parking field. The property to be acquired consists of 23 parcels all of which were heretofore zoned by the village for residential purposes. The evidence showed that a change in the zoning of property in the vicinity of the subject parcels had been under study since 1951 when the trustees of the village engaged a zoning expert to confer on a general revision of the ordinance. An advisory committee prepared and submitted to the trustees a draft of a proposed new zoning ordinance. This was the subject of a public hearing on January 25, 1953. A map delineating the proposed zone changes was dated and filed in the Nassau County Clerk’s office on March 20, 1953.

On June 25, 1953, a hearing was heard with respect to the proposed revision of the zoning ordinance before the Board of Trustees and the hearing was adjourned to July 2, 1953. On November 30, 1953, the report of the advisory committee was printed, and a memorandum was submitted by such committee to the Board of Trustees in which it was recommended that several of the parcels (D-1, D-2, and D-3, Washington Avenue frontage) be changed on the proposed map from C-O to R-6 Zone. The C-O Zone permitted the use of commercial offices on the property in that zone. In the R-6 Zone the property was restricted to one-family residences. On February 18, 1954, this recommendation was approved and adopted by the village trustees over the opposition of some of the property owners. The public hearing in relation to this condemnation proceeding was had on May 27, 1954.

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An application pursuant to CPLR Article 78 by petitioners PJB and VJB to, inter alia, annul the determination of respondent SCO Family of Services (SCO) dated May 6, 2010, which concluded that petitioners’ residence located at 419 Pine Place, Uniondale, New York could no longer be maintained as a foster home and would be closed effective May 28, 2010, is determined as follows.

Motion by respondent SCO pursuant to CPLR 1001(a) and 1003 to dismiss the proceeding for failure to join an indispensable party is determined as follows.

Since in or about 2005, petitioners, who allege that they possess a certificate for the care of children at board with the Nassau County Department of Social Services, have operated a foster home for the care of children at 419 Pine Street, Uniondale, New York under the auspices of respondent SCO,1 a not-for-profit foster care agency authorized by the New York State Office of Children’s and Family Services to provide foster care services.2 According to petitioners, they have successfully housed several children since in or about 2005 when their relationship with the Salvation Army began.

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In two proceedings under the Election Law (Section 330) for the judicial recanvass, review and recount of all the absentee and military ballots cast in the last general election for the office of District Court Judge of the County of Nassau, in the Third Assembly District, one proceeding having been brought by Frank X. Altimari, the candidate of the Republican Party, and the other proceeding having been brought by Julius R. Lippman, the candidate of the Democratic Party, the candidate Altimari appeals from the following judgment and order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County: (1) a judgment entered January 22, 1965 after a prior appeal and the hearing held pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ remittitur thereon, dated January 7 1965, 15 N.Y.2d 686, 256 N.Y.S.2d 133, 204 N.E.2d 332 [and amended February 11, 1965], which judgment declared that the two military ballots numbered 33-1 and 33-2 are valid and constitute two additional votes for candidate Lippman and that there is a tie vote for the said office, and directed that the Board of Canvassers amend its statement of canvass and the Board of Elections certify the results accordingly; and (2) an order entered January 20, 1965, which denied the candidate Altimari’s motion to reopen the proceedings so as to permit the introduction of newly discovered evidence with respect to the residence and qualification of the two voters who cast and mailed the said military ballots 33-1 and 33-2.

Judgment reversed on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and proceedings remitted to Special Term to take plenary proof with respect to the eligibility and qualifications to vote of the persons who cast and mailed to two military ballots numbered 33-1 and 33-2; an for a determination as to the validity of said ballots based upon such proof. No questions of fact were considered.

The order reversed on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and motion granted.

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In this proceeding was instituted pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR by Mr. and Mrs. Banks, public assistance recipients, compelling Respondents to pay the balance owed by the Banks for the installation of a heating system in their home.

Mrs. Banks is the fee owner of the home where she and her husband live together with their six minor children. In 1965, before the Banks were receiving public assistance, they ordered on time payment the installation of a heating system for the second floor of their home to make that floor habitable for the children of their burgeoning family during the winter. They have been receiving public assistance continuously since 1966.

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Upon the foregoing papers, petitioners individually, as preliminary executor of the estate of the decedent and as the vested beneficial owner of shares of the respondent 4C Foods Corp. held by certain trusts, moves for an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 2221 granting leave to renew respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition that was granted in this court’s order dated December 5, 2012, and upon renewal, denying respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition; and (2), pursuant to CPLR 3025, granting petitioners leave to file and serve an amended petition.

Petitioners’ motion is denied with respect to petitioners’ claims pursuant to Business Corporation Law §§ 623 and 806. With respect to the proposed causes of action premised on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty, the motion to amend is denied, but with leave to file an amended pleading containing such causes of action upon the following events: (1) the executor of the estate of the decedent, is barred from transferring voting shares individually; (2) these voting shares are purchased by respondent, its directors and or its majority shareholders; and (3) such causes of action are not otherwise rendered moot by any determination made in the Nassau County declaratory judgment action. The motion for leave to file an amended petition is granted with respect to the proposed declaratory judgment claim in which petitioner seeks a declaration that the January 11, 2013 notice addressing the transfer of voting shares formerly controlled is a nullity. The special proceeding is converted to a declaratory judgment action, but any further proceedings in the action are stayed pending the determination of the Nassau County declaratory judgment action.

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The issue raised in this case involves the application of Article 16 of the CPLR and its effect on the instructions to be given to the jury concerning apportionment of fault between tortfeasors, one of whom was negligent and the other an intentional tortfeasor, not a party to the lawsuit.

Plaintiff and her husband had an ongoing marital dispute. He had in the recent past thrown a substance in plaintiff’s eyes, temporarily blinding her, stolen her car and threatened to kill her. On January 8, 1992, plaintiff obtained a Temporary Order of protection against her husband from the Family Court Queens County. The order was renewed by that court on January 27, 1992 and was in effect on the night of the incident which gave rise to the suit against the County, February 13, 1992. The Family Court had also issued a warrant for the husband’s arrest.

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A New York Family Lawyer said the mother applied for public assistance and medical aid from the County Department of Social Services for herself and her unborn child. At the time of the application, she was 20 years old and living separate and apart from her husband and residing in the home of her parents in Bethpage. Without any factual determination concerning the amount of child support actually furnished by her parents, the County Department of Social Services notified her that her application for eligibility for public assistance was being denied. The agency’s position was that she is under twenty-one, her parents are responsible for her, she is residing with her own parents, and they are of sufficient ability to support her. As far as the unborn child, there are no needs to be met for the unborn child.

A New York Custody Lawyer said following a fair hearing proceeding, the hearing officer rendered a decision affirming the denial of assistance by the County Department of Social Services on the grounds that when a pregnant woman applies for public assistance for her unborn child and her needs are being met, the unborn child has no unmet needs.

A Nassau County Family Lawyer said thereafter, the mother commenced the Article 78 proceeding wherein she seeks to annul the determination after the fair hearing challenging the alleged practice and policy of the respondents of denying public assistance to married minors on the grounds that they are the legal responsibility of their parents; denying eligibility of married minors for public assistance by assuming resources of legally non-responsible relatives is available for their support without a finding that such resources are in fact being expended for the minor’s support; and denying eligibility of the unborn child for public assistance on the grounds that the pregnant mother’s needs are being met and the unborn child is precluded from establishing independent needs.

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A New York Family Lawyer said this is a special proceeding instituted under Article 78 of the CPLR in which the petitioner seeks an order restraining the Family Court of the State of New York. This application is made on the theory that by virtue of two orders made in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings brought by the petitioner in those proceedings. The parties were formerly husband and wife. The latter has filed with the Family Court in the County of Nassau, two petitions. In one petition she sets forth that in an action instituted in the First Civil Court, District of Bravos, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico, a decree was duly entered by which husband was directed to provide for her spousal support and the child support of the three children of the marriage.

A Nassau County Family lawyer said that the wife further alleges that in December 1958 by order of one of the Justices of this Court, the husband was ordered to pay the sum of Sixty ($60) Dollars a week for the support of the three children. She alleges that no exclusive jurisdiction was retained either by the Mexican Court or the Supreme Court of Nassau by the decrees referred to. She then alleges that since the entry of the Mexican decree, and since the entry of the order of the Supreme Court of Nassau County, there has been a change in circumstances which would warrant an increase in the amount of money to be paid for the support of the children and she seeks an order modifying both the Mexican decree and the Supreme Court order to that effect. In another petition filed under the same index number in the Family Court of Nassau County, the wife as petitioner again alleges the entry of the decree in Mexico and the decree in Nassau County and that neither of those courts has retained exclusive jurisdiction. She alleges that the husband, respondent in those proceedings, has failed to comply with the order of the Mexican Court and the order of the Supreme Court of Nassau County, and that he has failed to pay the $20. a week for the support of the child, and has failed to pay Temple dues for the children. In this petition she prays that the said respondent be dealt with in accordance with Article 4 of the Family Court Act. The substance of both petitions seek to obtain an order of the Family Court directing payment by the father of the children for the support of the children. The father, as petitioner before this court, proceeds on the theory that by the order in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, and a subsequent order of this court in which certain provisions of the order were modified in connection with custody and visitation of the children and provisions made in connection with the payment of the $60. per week provided in the order, the Supreme Court had retained exclusive jurisdiction of the matter thus depriving the Family Court of jurisdiction. This argument is based upon § 461 of the Family Court Act. By that section it is provided that a separation agreement, and decree of separation, and a final decree or judgment terminating a marriage relationship does not eliminate or diminish either parent’s duty to a child support of the marriage under sections 413 and 414 of Article 4 of the Family Court Act. It states that in the absence of an order of the Supreme Court or of another court of competent jurisdiction requiring child support, the Family Court may entertain a petition and make an order for its support. It further provides that if an order of the Supreme Court or of another court of competent jurisdiction requires support of the child, the Family Court may (1) entertain an application to enforce the order requiring support; or (2) entertain an application to modify such order on the ground that changed circumstances require such modification, ‘unless the order of the supreme court provides that the supreme court retains exclusive jurisdiction to enforce or modify the order.’

A Nassau County Family Lawyer the order of the Supreme Court of Nassau County provided among other things ‘that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of the parties hereto for the purpose of enforcing, modifying or altering this order.’. The order contained a similar clause ‘that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of the parties hereto for the purpose of enforcing, modifying or altering this order. Neither one of the orders provided in words or substance that the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction to enforce or modify the order. Each of the orders simply stated that jurisdiction of the parties was retained. However, an examination of the law discloses that the Supreme Court of Nassau County had no power to grant that part of the order which directed the future support of the minor children. The proceeding pending before the court on which that order was based was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in connection with the custody of the children. There was no marital action pending in the Supreme Court of New York State. Under such a situation the only provisions for compelling the future support of minor children were Sections 30 and 30-a of the Children’s Court Act.

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A New York Family Lawyer said in an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, as granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to enjoin and restrain him from withdrawing any funds from an investment account into which the proceeds of a medical malpractice action settlement were deposited to the extent of limiting his withdrawals to the sum of only $4,627 per month and denied those branches of his cross motion which were for awards of pendente lite child support and an attorney’s fee.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the relevant facts are set forth in a related appeal. An appellate court should rarely modify a pendente lite award, and then ” only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations, or justice otherwise requires”. Further, pendente lite awards “should be an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse with due regard for the pre-separation standard of living” “Any perceived inequities in pendente lite support can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties’ financial circumstances can be fully explored”. Here, in denying that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for an award of pendente lite child support, the Supreme Court properly considered the defendant’s actual reasonable living expenses, and there are no exigent circumstances sufficient to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination on this issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for an award of pendente lite child support.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for an award of an interim attorney’s fee.

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A New York Family Lawyer said that, in three related proceedings, inter alia, for modification of child support and maintenance obligations, the petitioner husband appeals (1) from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, entered December 20, 1988, which denied his objections to so much of an order of the same court, dated September 19, 1988, as dismissed his application to increase the wife’s child support obligation, (2) from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, entered May 18, 1989, which denied his objections to an order of the same court, dated March 16, 1989, dismissing his application to reduce his maintenance obligation, and (3) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Nassau County, entered June 8, 1989, as denied his application to (a) vacate an income execution served on his employer, (b) adjudge the wife’s employer to be in contempt, and (c) vacate the order entered December 20, 1988.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that, the parties settled their divorce action on July 22, 1983, by entering into a stipulation which was incorporated in but did not merge with their judgment of. The stipulation provided for the wife, at that time a full-time homemaker, to be the custodial parent of the parties’ two children. The parties further agreed that their assets, including the marital residence, would be essentially split evenly, and that the husband would pay child support as well as $100 per week maintenance.

A Bronx Family Lawyer said that, the custody of both children was subsequently transferred to the father, and the wife obtained employment outside the home. Following the change in custody, in March 1987 the Supreme Court directed the wife to pay child support in the sum of $10 per week per child. Fifteen months later, the husband commenced a Family Court proceeding seeking upward modification of the wife’s support obligation. He then commenced a second proceeding seeking elimination of the maintenance obligation imposed by the stipulation of settlement, and a third proceeding, inter alia, to renew his application for increased child support. The Family Court denied him the relief sought, and these appeals ensued.

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