Articles Posted in Suffolk County

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In this case the Family Court was asked to determine whether to modify a visitation order to give the mother unsupervised visitation with her children.

In New York, visitation with a child is typically unsupervised.  This means that the non-custodial parent is generally permitted time alone with the child and is free to do whatever he or she chooses to do with the child as long as it is not in violation of the custody order. If, however, the court determines that it is not safe for the child to spend time alone with the parent, then the court will order supervised visitation.  Family Court will order supervised visitation when it determines that the child may be in danger if alone with the parent.  For example, if the parent is struggling with alcohol or drug addiction, the court would likely require supervised visitation.  If the parent has physically abused the child, the court may not want the parent to be alone with the child.  Also, supervised visitation may be required if there is a concern that the parent may abduct the child.

In Spencer v. Killoran the mother did not have custody of her children.  When the children were 6 years old, the court awarded custody to the cousins of the mother because of the mother’s abuse of alcohol. Three years later, the mother requested access to her children in the form of visitation.  Not entirely convinced that the mother had stopped abusing alcohol, the court entered an order allowing the mother unsupervised scheduled visitation with her children with the stipulation that she was monitored daily for alcohol use for a period of 6 months.  On two dates during the 6-month period, the mother tested positive for alcohol use.  The cousins petitioned the court to modify the visitation schedule to require the mother to have only supervised visits.  The court so ordered.  However, the court did not set a supervised visitation schedule, and instead directed that the visitation would be as the mother and cousins agreed. The mother appeals, arguing that the court erred in modifying the previous visitation order.

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T v T

In this case, the family court determined that the Respondent violated two temporary Orders for Protection. It was found that the court acted properly in entering an order for protection after these findings.

The Petitioner filed an offense petition against the Respondent, She received a temporary Order for Protection. While that order was pending, the court found that the Respondent had violations on two temporary orders. The court dismissed the family offense order but sustained the violation of the petitions and issued a one year order for protection. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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The plaintiffs, District Court Judges of the Suffolk County District Court, seek among other things, a judgment declaring the perpetuation of an unfavorable salary disparity between the plaintiffs and the Judges of the only other District Court in the State, that of adjoining Nassau County, violative of the equal protection provisions of our Federal and State Constitutions. As a supplementary item of relief plaintiffs also sought a judgment covering the resulting unconstitutional salary differential commencing with April 1, 1977, the date the Judges became employees of the State’s unified court system. 2 Named as defendant were the State, its Comptroller, the Chief Administrator of the Courts (both in this capacity and as the representative of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference) and the County of Suffolk.

The parties having stipulated that the facts were not in dispute, on a motion for summary judgment Supreme Court, Westchester County, sitting at Special Term, found merit in the constitutional claim and, in a judgment dated July 29, 1980, though it dismissed the complaint against the county, declared that the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection will have been violated unless the other defendants (hereinafter “the State”) took “all appropriate steps to end the salary disparity” prior to October 1, 1980. On cross appeals to the Appellate Division, Second Department, the State directed its attention to the declaration on constitutionality of the salary differential, while the plaintiffs addressed only the correctness of so much of the judgment as allowed the disparity to continue until October 1, 1980. The Appellate Division, 82 A.D.2d 441, 442 N.Y.S.2d 80, applying the rational basis test, as had the Supreme Court, and agreeing that the case presented a potential constitutional violation, modified the judgment by substituting April 1, 1982 for October 1, 1980 as the target date for elimination of the disparity and otherwise affirmed.

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