Articles Posted in Nassau

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This private placement adoption action presents a number of intertwined legal issues that highlight the shortcomings of the private placement adoption statutes in New York State. The infant who is the subject of the case has now been in the home of the petitioners since February 21, 1998 without the benefit of a valid adoption consent from the parents or a currently valid pre-adoption certification order. The adoption agency that originally accepted custody of the child is no longer supervising this placement because it was not licensed in the state where the child was born. Additionally, the fees charges by the principals involved may not be entirely allowable under New York State law.

Background This petition was filed in Kings County Family Court by Mrs. M and Mr. M. on June 10, 1999 seeking adoption of a male child born 2/19/98 in Biddeford, Maine to Mrs. P. Mr. P is listed as the child’s father. The petition alleges that the child has been in the care of the petitioners since 2/21/98.

A review of documents filed supplementing the adoption petition indicates that while petitioners were found to be qualified adoptive parents pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 115-d by order of Kings County Surrogate’s Court dated 1/13/94, at the time this petition was filed in the Family Court on June 10, 1999 the petitioners were no longer certified as qualified adoptive parents. Surrogate’s Court extended the original certification order until 2/1/96 when it lapsed. Apparently, the Surrogate permitted Mr. and Mrs. M. to apply for “recertification” and issued a one-year order on January 5, 1998 that continued until January 5, 1999.

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People v. Badalamenti

NY Slip Op 02556

The highest court in New York has held that parents can legally eavesdrop on their children if they believe that it is in their best interests. This ruling by the New York State Supreme Court established an exception to existing wiretapping without consent laws.

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For a number of years the defendant has operated a junk yard on property located on U.S. Route 20, Town of Nassau in Rensselaer County. Over the years there have been disagreements between the Town and the petitioner with regard to the petitioner’s operation of the junk yard and the Town’s efforts to regulate it. In August 2002 the Town commenced an action against the petitioner in an attempt to enforce Town of Nassau Local Law No. 1 [1989] with regard to the licensing and regulation of junk yards. That action was ultimately resolved when the parties entered into a stipulation which was so-ordered by the undersigned on September 9, 2002. In May 2003 the Town of Nassau commenced the instant action against the defendant.

The action was temporarily halted when the parties, on November 8, 2004. entered into a Stipulation of Settlement which was so-ordered by the Court. That agreement, arrived at after much litigation and negotiation, memorialized a number of commitments on defendant’s part regarding the manner in which he would operate and maintain the junk yard. By reason of defendant’s violations of the November 8, 2004 Stipulation of Settlement the plaintiff, in June 2006, commenced an enforcement proceeding seeking to permanently enjoin the operation of the junk yard and for liquidated damages. On June 8, 2007 the Court, after a hearing, issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from further operation of the junk yard and awarding plaintiff liquidated damages.

The Court found that the defendant failed to erect and maintain a twelve foot high perimeter fence as agreed to in the Stipulation of Settlement; that he used junk vehicles as “gates” for the fence; that he failed to remove motor vehicles from outside the perimeter fence; and that he failed to remedy violations within 48 hours of receiving notice thereof from the plaintiff. On June 26, 2008 the defendant entered into a contract with JB Car Services, Inc. (“JB Car bervices) to clean up of the property. A copy of the contract was forwarded to the attorney for the plaintiff. Under the contract, JB Car Services was to remove all cars, trucks, trailers, tires, equipment and miscellaneous metals by October 1, 2008. By letter dated September 18, 2008, plaintiffs counsel imposed a deadline of October 2, 2008 to complete the clean up. In furtherance of counsel’s letter, on October 1, 2008 plaintiff caused its Building Inspector, RJ, to visit the junk yard for purposes of conducting an inspection. Mr. RJ observed numerous motor vehicles, auto parts, tires, buses, commercial trucks and truck part on the site. He observed vehicles stored within twenty-five feet of the property line. He noted that outdoor storage of vehicles violated a Town regulation requiring an approved site plan for such storage. As promised, by order to show cause dated October 3, 2008 plaintiff commenced the instant proceeding to hold the defendant in contempt of court by reason of defendant’s continued operation of the junkyard in violation of the permanent injunction. The defendant submitted opposition to the application, and a hearing thereon was held on July 30, 2009.

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This is an application for a preliminary injunction. The proceeding was commenced by Petitioner by order to show cause and petition seeking a judgment declaring him to be the owner of real property located at Merrick, New York (the Property), or imposing a constructive trust. The order to show cause, which was issued on November 9, 2007, contained a temporary restraining order restraining respondent and/or her agents from transferring, selling or otherwise encumbering the Property and from terminating the tenancy of a brokerage) pending the return date of the order to show cause. Jurisdiction is complete.

On December 5, 2007, the court held a hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. The hearing continued on December 6, 2007 and concluded the following day.

At the close of the hearing, the court vacated from the bench that portion of the temporary restraining order that restrained the respondent and/or her agents from terminating the tenancy of the brokerage. The court issued a written order to that effect on December 11, 2007.

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The Defendant is charged with two counts Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree and Unlawful Fleeing of a Police Officer in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law §§ 220.03 and 270.25, respectively, along with Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs, four counts of Failing to Stop at a Stop Sign, and Passing a Steady Red Light, in violation of VTL §§ 1192(4), 1172(a) and 1111(d)(1), respectively.

A hearing was held to determine issues involving probable cause for the Defendant’s arrest, suppression of all tangible evidence seized from the Defendant and/or his vehicle, and the suppression of statements allegedly made by the Defendant.

At the hearing, where a defendant challenges the legality of a search and seizure, along with statements allegedly obtained as a result thereof, the People have the burden of going forward, in the first instance, to establish the legality of the police conduct. Once the prosecution has met this burden, the defendant has the ultimate burden to establish the illegality of the police conduct, by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The burden is also on the People to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statements in question were voluntarily made before their admission into evidence on the People’s case in chief at trial.

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This is a Motion by Respondent for an Order pursuant to Section 3212 of the C.P.L.R. dismissing a proceeding filed by the Nassau County Department of Social Services with prejudice on the grounds that Respondent has an absolute defense to the proceeding due to a discharge in bankruptcy of the debt allegedly owed to Nassau County Department of Social Services, and is defending against the violation petition filed by the Department interposing a defense that the arrears of $1,505.00 were discharged in bankruptcy.

Respondent filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District on August 16, 1979. The debt due the Department of Social Services was included in the bankruptcy petition. The Department of Social Services received notification of the proceeding.

On February 4, 1981 the Respondent was granted a discharge in bankruptcy. The Petitioner opposes this Motion on the ground that under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 a debt which is a child support obligation would be exempted from discharge unless such debt was assigned to another entity.

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In this proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, the petitioner seeks a judgment, in the nature of a writ of mandamus, requiring the respondent County Treasurer to permit her to redeem two contiguous parcels of real property which were the subjects of tax lien sales and, upon petitioner’s payment of the amount of said liens, together with any interest and penalties due thereon, directing the respondent County Clerk to cancel of record the deeds previously given by the respondent County Treasurer to the purchasers of the tax liens.

The petition is grounded upon the claim that the petitioner, as owner of the property, was not given actual notice of the sale of the tax liens and that the respondents failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Nassau County Administrative Code.

Before examining the facts underlying this application and before weighing the merits of the petition, it should be noted that although the petitioner has another procedural remedy available in that she could test the validity of the deeds given by the County Treasurer in an action in equity to determine adverse interests in the subject property, none of the respondents have challenged the appropriateness of reviewing the acts herein complained of by means of a proceeding under CPLR Article 78. Moreover, there is authority to the effect that mandamus is a proper vehicle for such review. While the parties have not raised the issue, the Court notes it because, as stated in the first of the cases cited Supra, ‘the determination of the County Treasurer challengeable under Article 78 CPLR is his determination that the purchaser at the sale of the tax lien is entitled to a deed’.

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This is one of a series of applications numbering between motions and cross motions almost twenty all of which deal with the same aspects of public assistance grants in the category of Aid to Dependent Children. Petitioner seeks an order annulling a determination after fair hearing by Respondent Blum and a declaratory judgment invalidating the rules of the New York State Department of Social Services with respect to the recovery of advance utility payments as well as the procedure employed by the Nassau County Department of Social Services in recovering such payments pursuant to 18 NYCRR § 352.29(e).

Petitioner and her three minor children are currently receiving public assistance in the category of Aid to Dependent Children. Having previously received such assistance between June 27, 1978 and January 15, 1979, during the interval between January 15, 1979 and their restoration to the public assistance rolls on December 12, 1979 they were not the recipients of aid in this or apparently in any other category. After their restoration to the relief rolls, in January of 1980 their utility supplier, threatened to discontinue service because of nonpayment. Petitioner sought help from the Nassau County Department of Social Services. The Department agreed to make an advance to forestall a utility shutoff pursuant to 18 NYCRR § 352.7(g)(5) provided Petitioner signed a written request.

Between January and April of 1980 Petitioner’s grants were reduced by virtue of the Department’s recovery of the sum thus advanced as well as to recover certain sums paid directly to the utility between May 3, 1978 and September 8, 1978 on behalf of the Petitioner who was at that time receiving public assistance. The reductions ceased in April but in July of 1980 the Department notified Petitioner that it proposed further reductions to recover sums paid directly to utility on her behalf between November 4, 1978 and February 28, 1979 as well as funds advanced for utility expenses between September 5, 1979 and January 7, 1980 and between January 7, 1980 and May 5, 1980.

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This case involves domestic violence and a motion to dismiss the indictment and an order transferring all the proceedings herein from the County Court to the Family Court of Nassau County was raised by the defendant. Defendant is charged with assault, second degree. The particular act involved herein arose as a result of an altercation between defendant and his wife during which the defendant is charged with stabbing his wife with a knife. The defendant urges this Court to transfer the entire proceedings to the Family Court inasmuch as the alleged assault arose during a family dispute.

They are presented with the problem of whether the Family Court, in the case of a felonious assault inflicted by one spouse upon another, is the sole and exclusive forum to the exclusion of the County Court. The act complained of for which the defendant stands indicted is clearly a crime against the State if proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of a jury (Penal Law, § 242).

Equally, it is within the power and in fact it is the duty of the Grand Jury to inquire into all crimes committed, present them to the Court which must try and determine all such crimes. Such mandate and jurisdiction of the County Court is rooted in Article 6, Section 11(a) of the New York State Constitution.

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