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This is a hybrid proceeding for relief under the Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”), set forth in Article 6 of the Public Officers Law,§§ 84-90, and for related declaratory and mandamus relief. Petitioner/plaintiff asserts that the respondent/defendant Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD” or “respondent”) has violated FOIL by consistently failing to respond properly to legitimate requests for information and documents.

It seeks not only a vacatur of denials for certain information, but also a declaration by the Court that NCPD has engaged in a pattern and practice of refusing to obey the law, and a judgment in mandamus directing the NCPD to do what it is bound to do under FOIL. It also seeks a related direction ordering respondent, in effect, to certify to the Court annually that it is in compliance with the statute. Finally, petitioner seeks to recoup its costs, including legal fees, expended in its efforts to obtain the information sought.

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The decedent a bachelor, died on November 9, 1918, at the age of 75. His only near relatives living at the time of his death were his sister, and her descendants. There were no other kinsmen of nearer relationship than second cousin one degree removed. The decedent stated in his will that his sister and her family had been amply provided for by the will of his father. By his will, dated May 23, 1917, he gave all of his residuary estate, amounting to nearly $1,000,000, to the Family Association, a corporation organized in January, 1910, under the laws of the state of New York, ‘to have and to hold to the said association, its successors and assigns forever.’

The corporation having duly accepted the bequest, an order of the surrogate of Nassau county was duly made and entered imposing a tax upon the transfer thus made [232 N.Y. 368]pursuant to article 10 of the Tax Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60). The Family Association, claiming that it was a charitable corporation, and entitled to an exemption under section 221 of the Tax Law, appealed to the Appellate Division, which sustained this claim, and reversed the order of the surrogate. It remains for us, therefore, to determine on this appeal which court has been correct, the Surrogate’s Court or the Appellate Division, the former holding that the association is not a charitable corporation and the latter that it is.

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This private placement adoption action presents a number of intertwined legal issues that highlight the shortcomings of the private placement adoption statutes in New York State. The infant who is the subject of the case has now been in the home of the petitioners since February 21, 1998 without the benefit of a valid adoption consent from the parents or a currently valid preadoption certification order.

The adoption agency that originally accepted custody of the child is no longer supervising this placement because it was not licensed in the State where the child was born. Additionally, the fees charged by the principals involved may not be entirely allowable under New York State law.

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In this plenary action in contract brought by a wife who seeks a money judgment for arrears in support payments due her under a separation agreement, the overriding issue is the proper interpretation of a provision of the agreement. Section 23 of the agreement specifically declares that the agreement is to survive any subsequent divorce decree obtained by either party, and it further provides that although the custody, spousal support and maintenance provisions of the separation agreement may be incorporated by reference into such a divorce decree, they are not to be merged within it. Some time following the separation, the husband obtained a bilateral Mexican divorce decree which incorporated those sections of the separation agreement but specifically declared that they were to survive the decree. Eventually, the wife deemed it necessary to seek an order of support in Family Court, Nassau County, for the $200 per week support and maintenance provided in the divorce decree pursuant to the terms of the separation agreement (see Family Ct. Act, § 422, subd. (b); § 461, subd. (b); § 466, subd. (c)). The husband countered with a request that the amount of support and maintenance be decreased, and, following issuance of several orders not pertinent to this appeal, Family Court ultimately decreased the amount of support and maintenance awarded by the divorce decree to $95 a week and issued a support order for that amount.

The wife then commenced this action in Supreme Court, Nassau County, seeking a money judgment in the amount of the difference between the support and maintenance payments established by the separation agreement and the reduced amount provided by the Family Court order. In response, the husband contended that pursuant to section 24 of the separation agreement, the modification by Family Court of the amount of support and maintenance due under the divorce decree served also as a modification of the separation agreement provisions pertaining to support and maintenance. Following a nonjury trial, Supreme Court ruled in favor of the husband, concluding that pursuant to section 24 of the separation agreement, the modification of the divorce decree by Family Court did in fact cause a similar modification of the separation agreement.

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In this proceeding under Family Court Act article 10, the New York City Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the Administration for Children’s Services, seeks leave of the court to allow the respondent’s placement with the Commissioner of Social Services [CSS] to lapse, in light of the respondent’s placement with the New York State Division for Youth [DFY].

This court placed the respondent, now fourteen years old, with CSS on October 22, 1991. The Commissioner of Social Services brought a neglect proceeding against the respondent’s father, after the father left respondent in the care of a girlfriend without making any provision for the child’s care. Respondent’s mother died in 1987. CSS worked with the father for the respondent’s return to his care for four years, during which time the father intermittently was incarcerated. In the summer of 1995, the 13 year old respondent ran away from foster care and took up residence with his father.

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The respondent appears specially, by counsel, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition is fatally defective, in that it is made wholly on information and belief.

The petition charges the respondent with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed certain acts in violation of the Penal Law as well as of a local municipal ordinance. The petitioner alleges that he is a person authorized to institute such a proceeding under article 7 of the Family Court Act by reason of the fact that he is one who suffered injury as a result of the said illegal acts of the respondent.

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The instant case presents this court with issues of first impression in New York regarding the status and ultimate disposition of fertilized human ova that are the product of an in vitro fertilization (hereinafter IVF) procedure in which one of the prospective parents no longer wishes to participate. Although the parties have raised, inter alia, various fundamental legal and policy arguments in support of their respective positions, we conclude that this controversy is governed by the intent of the parties as clearly expressed in the provisions of an informed consent document which they voluntarily executed as participants in the IVF program and in a subsequent “uncontested divorce” instrument which they executed shortly thereafter, both of which manifest their mutual election that the IVF program should retain the cryopreserved pre-zygotes for approved research purposes under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, by stipulating to the decision of this matter on submissions, the parties have charted their own course and the plaintiff, not having submitted sufficient evidence to support her contentions, cannot prevail.

The plaintiff and the defendant were married on July 4, 1988. Apparently as a result of her in utero exposure to Diethylstilbistrol (DES), the plaintiff experienced difficulty in conceiving a child through coital relations. Accordingly, the parties enrolled in the Long Island IVF program at John T. Mather Memorial Hospital and at that time executed a “General IVF Consent Form No. 1”. It is undisputed that the parties underwent 10 unsuccessful attempts to have a child through IVF between March 1990 and June 1993, at a total cost in excess of $75,000. The last of these procedures commenced in May 1993. On May 12, 1993, prior to the procedure, the parties executed a single, seven-page informed consent document dealing with cryopreservation and consisting of two sections, to wit: “INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2: CRYOPRESERVATION OF HUMAN PRE-ZYGOTES”, comprising pages one to five of the document, and “INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2–ADDENDUM NO. 2-1: CRYOPRESERVATION–STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION”, consisting of pages six and seven. Insofar as relevant, the first section of the document contained the following general language regarding cryopreservation: “III Disposition of Pre-Zygotes. “We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes will be stored for a maximum of 5 years. We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our frozen pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose without the written consent of both of us, consistent with the policies of the IVF Program and applicable law. In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the disposition of our frozen pre-zygotes remaining in storage.

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This termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding was brought pursuant to Social Service Law (SSL) section 384–b by Petitioner against respondent in connection to her child, age four. The petition, filed August 24, 2009, seeks to terminate the parental rights of RM on the grounds of mental illness.1 The Court held a fact finding hearing on September 22, 2010, October 18, 2010, December 21, 2010, January 18, 2011, January 20, 2011, January 21, 2011, February 4, 2011, March 4, 2011 and April 26, 2011. On June 27, 2011, counsel delivered oral summations with supplemental written summations submitted to the Court on July 8, 2011.

The petitioner presented the testimony of one (1) witness: a qualified expert in the field of clinical psychology. Respondent presented the testimony of two (2) witnesses: a qualified expert in the field of forensic psychology, and RM who testified on her own behalf. Petitioner also submitted for judicial notice the following court orders, decisions and documents/photographs, in connection with the underlying child protective proceeding and prior termination of parental rights proceeding brought against RM as to her child, who was freed for adoption by order dated June 24, 2008.

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On July 1, 2005, after spending several hours in a bar in Manhattan, at which he consumed at least six beers, the defendant attended a friend’s party in Merrick in Nassau County. He arrived at the party, which consisted of a small gathering of his friends, between 11 P.M. and midnight. The house where the party was being held was approximately a five-minute drive from the Meadowbrook State Parkway.

At the party, the defendant was seen consuming several alcoholic drinks. Two of the defendant’s friends who were at the party described the defendant as intoxicated or “buzzed.” However, neither one observed the defendant stumbling or staggering while he was dancing, nor was he observed to be slurring his words.

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I. Matter of St. Francis hospital, as attorney-in-fact for JL.

For approximately two weeks in May, 1977, JL was a patient at St. Francis Hospital. He incurred a bill of $4,794.90 and applied for medical assistance. The Nassau County Department of Social Services, however, declared him ineligible and his application was denied. He appealed the denial and, after a fair hearing which he attended along with an attorney retained by the hospital, the State Department of Social Services affirmed the determination of the local agency.

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