New York Family Law Blog

Published on: October 5, 2015

Administrator of Children’s Services Brings Suit Regarding Placement of Child

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding under Family Court Act article 10, the New York City Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the Administration for Children’s Services, seeks leave of the court to allow the respondent’s placement with the Commissioner of Social Services [CSS] to lapse, in light of the respondent’s placement with the New York State Division for Youth [DFY].

This court placed the respondent, now fourteen years old, with CSS on October 22, 1991. The Commissioner of Social Services brought a neglect proceeding against the respondent’s father, after the father left respondent in the care of a girlfriend without making any provision for the child’s care. Respondent’s mother died in 1987. CSS worked with the father for the respondent’s return to his care for four years, during which time the father intermittently was incarcerated. In the summer of 1995, the 13 year old respondent ran away from foster care and took up residence with his father.

Published on: October 4, 2015

ASC Brings Action Against Mother for Severe Abuse

by Stephen Bilkis

On June 20, 2011, the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) filed a petition against respondent mother alleging that she derivatively severely abused the subject child by committing reckless or intentional acts that evinced a depraved indifference to human life and caused serious physical injury to the subject child’s five-year-old sibling Jamar resulting in his death.

The subject child under the age of eighteen whose parent subjected the child to reckless or intentional acts committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, which resulted in serious physical injury to the child as defined in subdivision ten of section 10.00 of the penal law:

Published on: October 3, 2015

Court Decides Private Placement Adoption Action

by Stephen Bilkis

This private placement adoption action presents a number of intertwined legal issues that highlight the shortcomings of the private placement adoption statutes in New York State. The infant who is the subject of the case has now been in the home of the petitioners since February 21, 1998 without the benefit of a valid adoption consent from the parents or a currently valid pre-adoption certification order. The adoption agency that originally accepted custody of the child is no longer supervising this placement because it was not licensed in the state where the child was born. Additionally, the fees charges by the principals involved may not be entirely allowable under New York State law.

There is little statutory or caselaw guidance available to assist the court in unraveling these dilemmas, and few satisfactory remedies available for the obvious failures of those charged with caring for this child to follow the statutory requirements contained in the Domestic Relations Law. What seems apparent, however, is that along the way many purportedly well-intended people ignored the law, creating a situation that puts this adoption in jeopardy.

After an initial review of the adoption petition and the supplementary documents supplied by petitioner’s counsel with his letter dated August 3, 1999 the court issued a decision identifying legal issues of concern.

Published on: October 2, 2015

Petition Alleges that Mother Unjustly Receives Public Assistance

by Stephen Bilkis

This Article 78 proceeding raises the questions whether (1) the County Commissioner of Social Services has discretion as a matter of policy and without regard to the facts of the particular case to refuse a special grant to an aid to dependent children recipient who claims that she and the children are destitute because cash has been stolen from her and (2) whether the proceeding can be maintained as a class action.

The petition alleges that petitioner is the mother of four children, that she receives public assistance in the category of Aid to Dependent Children, that on July 31, 1971 she received a check issued by the Department of Social Services in the amount of $398.00 which she cashed at the bank where she spent $3.00, putting the remaining $395.00 in an envelope in her pocketbook, that she went to the laundromat and then back to the bank and when she sought to pay for the purchases then made could not find the envelope or the money, that she reported her loss to the Department of Social Services and the police, that she was told by the Department that nothing could be done, that its failure to act on petitioner’s request results from its policy of refusing to give emergency aid or to duplicate stolen checks, that without the issuance of a duplicate grant of $395.00, petitioner and her children face exhaustion of their food supply and eviction from their rented home.

Published on: October 1, 2015

Petitioner Claims that Jurisdiction is Fatally Defective

by Stephen Bilkis

The respondent appears specially, by counsel, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the petition is fatally defective, in that it is made wholly on information and belief.

The petition charges the respondent with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed certain acts in violation of the Penal Law as well as of a local municipal ordinance. The petitioner alleges that he is a person authorized to institute such a proceeding under article 7 of the Family Court Act by reason of the fact that he is one who suffered injury as a result of the said illegal acts of the respondent.

Published on: September 20, 2015

Defendant Claims Lack of Jurisdiction in Court Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

The defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 210.20(1)(e) and (h), to dismiss the fourth count of the captioned indictment. In support, he presses two grounds. First, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over that charge of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. Next, he maintains that trial of this count would constitute double jeopardy in any event.

The court has extensively examined all relevant federal and state constitutional provisions, sections of the Penal Law, Judiciary Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, and case law. Upon that review, it is not convinced that dismissal is warranted on either ground urged by the defense. However, for the reasons set forth below, count four of the indictment is dismissed in the interest of justice. CPL 210.20(1)(i).

Published on: September 19, 2015

Petitioner Moves for Order Granting Judgment

by Stephen Bilkis

In this proceeding, petitioner moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting summary judgment: (1) converting the QTIP trust to a unitrust; (2) compelling the sale of the family business interests for fair market value; (3) removing the decedent’s sister as co-trustee and requiring her to file her account; and (4) disqualifying the decedent’s father as successor co-trustee and immediately appointing an independent corporate fiduciary to succeed as co-trustee. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied, except to the extent that Deborah is directed to file an intermediate account of her acts as co-trustee of the QTIP trust as set forth below.

The decedent died testate on December 7, 2001, leaving his wife, who is now forty-six years old, and two children, who are now twenty and nineteen, respectively. Petitioner and the decedent’s sister are sisters-in-law, the latter having been decedent’s sister. Apparently, the close family relationship that existed between petitioner and the family while decedent was alive has deteriorated.

The decedent’s last will and testament dated October 28, 1998 was admitted to probate by this court in April 2002. Letters testamentary and letters of trusteeship for the QTIP trust established in the will were granted on the same date to the sister and the wife. They qualified as such and have acted and are still acting in those capacities.

Published on: September 9, 2015

Court Discusses Condemnation Proceedings

by Stephen Bilkis

In condemnation proceedings, claimant appeals, as limited by its brief and on the ground of inadequacy, from so much of a partial final decree of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 2, 1979, as awarded compensation for the improvements on the condemned realty.

In 1954, appellant leased some 361/2 acres of beachfront property on the south shore of Long Island from Ovide de St. Aubin and Manlio Liccione. (Liccione divested himself of his interest in the property prior to this proceeding.) The parties stipulated that their respective interests in the improvements in the property, in the event of condemnation, would be 71.7% to appellant and 28.3% to St. Aubin. These figures were reversed with respect to their respective interests in the land itself. Appellant constructed on the property a large clubhouse for catering, cabanas, lockers, swimming pools, tennis, handball and basketball courts, and other facilities, at a cost of.$2.5 million. The business operation of these facilities was a failure, however, and in 1968, at which time the beach club facilities had a stipulated depreciated value of $1.38 million, the facilities were condemned by the respondent town. From the time of condemnation until the present, the town operated the premises, as had appellant, as catering and recreational facilities. Indeed, the town has not made any substantial structural changes in the improvements on the property. In 1977 it realized an income of approximately $400,000 from the operation of the facilities.

Published on: September 1, 2015

Court Hears Guardianship Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

The petition presented in this Art. 81 guardianship proceeding raises two questions that this court has not previously addressed. The first is whether it is appropriate for a facility to petition the court solely for the appointment of a special guardian of the property of an alleged incapacitated person residing in its facility where the sole power sought is to complete the Medicaid application for the facility. The second question that follows is then where there is no healthcare proxy executed by the alleged incapacitated person does the Family Healthcare Decisions Act vitiate the need for a personal needs guardian. Here the court finds that a residential facility/hospital should not petition the court for the appointment of a special guardian for the sole purpose of seeking Medicaid benefits when the patient is clearly incapacitated and clearly needs a guardian of the person as well. For the reasons stated herein the court finds that the Family Healthcare Decisions Act is not a substitute for the appointment of a guardian of the person pursuant to Art. 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law.

The petitioner herein is the administrator of the A. Holly Patterson extended care facility located at 875 Jerusalem Avenue, Uniondale, N.Y. where the alleged incapacitated person, AG, currently resides. He had been taken there after being treated at Nassau University Medical Center for a cerebral vascular accident (also known as CVA). AG is 80 years old and suffers from right hemiparesis, cognitive deficits, and seizure disorder, as well as dementia. He requires a gastrointestinal feeding tube for nutrition due to dysphagia, and is incontinent of bowels. He is bed bound and needs assistance with all activities of daily living. However, the court evaluator indicated in his report to the court that AG had the ability to communicate his wishes and therefore the hearing was held at the facility and AG was present.

Petitioner originally limited its application under Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law for the appointment of a special guardian of the property while acknowledging in their application that AG is an incapacitated person. When the court inquired prior to the hearing as to why petitioner did not also move for the appointment of a guardian of the person, petitioner stated that they believed it was not necessary because DA, a son of the alleged incapacitated person, had been located locally and it was the facility’s position that because a surrogate was available the Family Healthcare Decisions Act allows for that surrogate to make all medical decisions for adult patients as needed. Further, even if no surrogate had been found the petitioner’s stated position was that under the Family Healthcare Decisions Act the hospital may make medical decisions for the patient. Therefore, a personal needs guardian was not needed.

Published on: August 31, 2015

Court Decides Private Placement Adoption

by Stephen Bilkis

In this private placement adoption the natural mother of the subject child, born on October 21, 1976, and her husband, the alleged father, by order to show cause dated November 17, 1977 request an order: (1) vacating and setting aside the natural mother’s consent to the subject child’s adoption; (2) dismissing the adoption proceeding filed by the respondents; (3) requesting the court to determine the custody of the child; and (4) directing the respondents to deliver the subject child to the petitioners.

Following extensive and protracted pre-trial discovery by all parties, testimony was heard by Surrogate for 16 days commencing November 17, 1978 and concluding on July 1, 1980. The transcript is in excess of 2,100 pages with 23 exhibits in evidence. During the course of the discovery and hearing, the court rendered 8 decisions, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the court to represent the interests of the child filed 3 interim and 1 final report. On July 31, 1980, before he could render a decision, Surrogate retired, which requires this court to render a decision on a bitterly contested matter which it did not hear.