New York Family Law Blog

Published on: October 19, 2013

Foster Mother Moves for Custody

by Stephen Bilkis

The child of herein parties was born in 1995, with a positive toxicology for cocaine. He was removed from his mother’s custody shortly after birth. Her parental rights were eventually terminated, as were the father’s in 1999. A New York Family Lawyer said both parents’ terminations were based on permanent neglect. During the time that the Department of Social Services (DSS) was providing services for the mother, the father was filing at least four custody proceedings. All of the father’s petitions were dismissed by the Family Court judge without a hearing. According to the trial court, the petitions were “dismissed due to [the father’s] unwillingness to partake in services recommended by [DSS].” For the years from 1995 to 1998, the father received one hour of DSS-supervised child visitation each week.

A New York Family attorney said that concerning the termination of parental rights finding, the Appellate Division held that DSS made no effort to satisfy its burden of showing that it had formulated a realistic plan that was tailored to fit the father’s circumstances. It also held that the Family Court judge “repeatedly thwarted the father’s efforts to establish the lack of any reasonable basis for the plan that was put in place. Obviously, the petition should have been dismissed at the conclusion of DSS’ case, if not earlier.” A New York Child Custody Lawyer said the Appellate Division, in finding that the Family Court judge had demonstrated hostility toward the father and his attorney, ordered that all further proceedings be conducted before a different judge.

Upon remand, the Court returned custody of the child to the father and entered a series of child visitation orders to facilitate the transition of the child back into the father’s home. During this period of time, the foster mother filed petitions seeking visitation and custody rights to the child. The Court rejected the foster mother’s claims. It found that there was no statutory, common law or constitutional basis to grant child visitation to a nonbiological, former custodian. The Court reserved on the question of whether the child has an independent constitutional right to seek visitation with his former foster mother and allowed the parties and the Law Guardian time to brief the issue. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said this decision answers that question in the affirmative. From the child’s birth in 1995 until April 2000, when he was returned to his father, the boy had lived with the foster mother for all of his life but for a few weeks.

Published on: October 18, 2013

Father Moves for Sole Custody

by Stephen Bilkis

A mother filed a motion to modify their divorce decree by deleting the requirement that she must reside with her three children within a radius of fifty miles of New York City. A New York Family Lawyer said the purpose of her application was to relocate the children with her. The father however cross-moved for sole custody of the children or, in the alternative, for an order conditioning the mother’s right to custody on her continued residency with the children within the aforementioned fifty miles radius.

Pursuant to the agreement, the father had the right to visit the children at any time on reasonable notice to the mother, and to have the children spend with him alternate weekends from Friday evening to Sunday evening. A New York Custody Lawyer said if the children went to summer camp, the father had the right to have any or all of them spend one-half of the remaining summer vacation time with him.

The mother stated that she wanted to relocate because she would be able to secure for them, similar if not, superior educational advantages without costs as well as outstanding recreational and summer activities at minimal costs. As for herself, she would be able to pursue her career in advertising and sales promotion which she could no longer do in New York City and at the same time spend more time with her children.

Published on: October 17, 2013

Court Discusses Complicated Case Involving a TRO

by Stephen Bilkis

Plaintiff A is the court appointed article 81 financial guardian for B. He is also the co-trustee of the B Family Trust. A New York Family Lawyer said these appointments were made only after the original action was brought. A has now interposed a third amended complaint on behalf of his ward. Defendant C as trustee and certain business defendants have brought a pre-answer motion to dismiss the fifth through fourteenth causes of action asserted in the third amended complaint. C has now joined in that motion in her individual capacity. Defendant D has separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to her. Defendant E separately moved to dismiss the causes of action asserted as to him.

F law firm separately moved to be relieved as counsel of record for certain defendants. This motion has already been denied by the court. A cross moved to: disqualify the F law firm; appoint a receiver; appoint a successor trustee in place of C of the B Family Trust; hold a hearing on whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for G; strike D’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss and strike C’s reply in support of her motion to dismiss. A subsequently withdrew his application to have a receiver appointed. A New York Custody Lawyer said that although the parties represented to the court that the only relief left in the cross-motion pertained to disqualification of the F law firm, other requested relief has not been formally withdrawn. Thus, still outstanding is A’s request for the appointment of a successor trustee, a guardian ad litem hearing and to strike reply papers on the motions to dismiss.

Because all of the motions and cross-motion are substantially interrelated and rely on similar facts and arguments made sometimes in overlapping papers, they are consolidated for consideration and determination in this single decision. At the outset the court rejects arguments that the court should refuse to consider any of the relief requested in A’s cross-motion because it was made at a time when a stay of the proceedings was in effect. Regardless of whether the temporary restraining order contained in the August 27, 2007 Order to Show Cause precluded the cross-motion at the time it was originally interposed, that TRO had long expired by the time the cross-motion was actually submitted to the court. In the interim, and certainly by the time of submission, all parties had been given an opportunity to oppose the relief requested in the cross-motion on the merits. Thus the relief requested by A will be considered on the merits.

Published on: October 15, 2013

Court Decides Jurisdiction Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

In this motion for leave to reargue respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and for leave to reargue the decision and order of this Court dated August 8, 1977. A New York Family Lawyer said that, respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction in this proceeding brought by petitioner, a resident of Queens County, for upward modification of divorce decree, Kings County, dated January 31, 1974. A Queens Divorce Lawyer said that, respondent argues that since he is a resident of Putnam County, a county which does not adjoin the City of New York, this Court lacks jurisdiction (and by inference that petitioner could proceed only by a petition brought in Putnam County, or by a proceeding under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, U.S.D.L.).

A Queens Order of Protection Lawyer said that, in October, 1974, an order was made in the Family Court, Kings County, where petitioner then resided (respondent then resided in New York County), on petitioner’s petition for enforcement of said decree. On March 18, 1977, respondent, then a resident of Putnam County, filed a petition in the Family Court, Queens County (where petitioner then resided and now resides) requesting expanded visitation with the child. A Queens Family Lawyer said that, on March 29, petitioner filed a petition in this Court requesting upward modification of support for the child. Both petitions were returnable in Kings County. When the Court was informed that neither party resided in Kings, the file was transferred to Queens County.

A New York Child Custody Lawyer said that, now respondent argues lack of jurisdiction as to petitioner’s petition, in spite of the fact that he desires a hearing in this County on his petition. In addition to the reasons set forth below it is obvious that to require two hearings, in two counties would create a needless multiplicity of suits.

Published on: October 14, 2013

Court Rules on Wilfull Violation of Court Order

by Stephen Bilkis

In 1996, a paternity and child support proceedings were initiated against a man regarding a child, born out of wedlock. A New York Family Lawyer said the matter was scheduled but on the day the man failed to appear. After an inquest, the court entered an order declaring the man to be the father of the child and immediately referred the issue of support to a hearing examiner.

In 1997, the hearing examiner issued an order requiring the man to make weekly payments for the benefit of the child and pay the counsel fee within sixty days from the date ordered. A New York Custody Lawyer said the directive was duly served on the man by mail. In 1998, the man failed to make any payments in any way for the benefit of the child.

The county’s department of social services commenced an action against the man in the family court based on his willful failure to comply with the order.

Published on: October 13, 2013

Court Decides Paternity Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

A man filed a verified petition seeking an order of the court vacating an order of filiation entered upon his admission. A New York Family Lawyer he had appeared before Hearing Examiner and admitted that he was the biological father of a boy who was born out of wedlock on January 25, 1988. In support of his present application, the man asserts that he has obtained a DNA test to exclude him as the father.

After answering papers were filed by the child’s assigned Law Guardian and the County Attorney on behalf of the mother and the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS), the issue of the admissibility and weight to be given to this privately arranged DNA paternity test was placed squarely before the court.

A New York Custody Lawyer said the DNA test which is the driving force behind this litigation was performed under unusual circumstances. In early January of 1999 the man telephoned a nationally syndicated television talk show called. He offered to provide a DNA sample and appear as a guest to argue that he was not the boy’s father. A representative of the show then telephoned the mother. She was equally convinced that DNA results would show that the man was the father; she agreed to provide samples of her own and the boy’s DNA. The mother’s decision was a necessary foundation for the upcoming show and eventually for this litigation.

Published on: October 12, 2013

Court Discusses Uniform Criminal Extradition Act

by Stephen Bilkis

In 1962, the accused left his wife and four minor children in California. His wife then entered into ‘a common law situation’ with a partner and adopted the name of her partner. A New York Family Lawyer said thereafter, she applied in California for public assistance for the children claiming that she did not receive any support from the accused. In 1971 she signed a misdemeanor complaint charging him with nonsupport. It was later determined that appellant was residing in New York and later, a reciprocal support petition was forwarded to the Family Court in New York. Thereafter, the court ordered that appellant to pay $16 a week for child support.

A Suffolk County Child Support lawyer said that the mother signed a felony complaint in California charging that appellant did ‘willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without lawful excuse, omit to furnish’ support for his min children in violation of section 270 of the Penal Code of California. The complaint was sworn to before a Judge of the Municipal Court who then issued a warrant for appellant’s arrest. He was arrested at his home in New York and held pending extradition proceedings.

A Brooklyn Family Lawyer said thereafter, an investigator from the District Attorney’s office in Orange County, California, sent an application for requisition to the Governor of California. The application states that appellant is properly charged, in due form, in accordance with the laws of this State with the crime of violation of section 270 of the California Penal Code, a felony, committed in the county of Orange’ and ‘That said fugitive from while out of the State of California, committed acts intentionally resulting in said crime in said county. In an affidavit attached to the application, the mother recited the history of the case as indicated above and also stated that she had not received any support from the accused since the entry of the New York Family Court order. In another affidavit to the same effect Woodington noted that ‘this office has received no funds from the defendant’. Both of these affidavits were sworn to before a Judge of the Municipal Court of Orange County.

Published on: October 11, 2013

Court Modifies Child Support Obligation

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Family Lawyer said in an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant man appeals from a decision of the Suffolk County Supreme Court made after a nonjury trial, and as limited by his brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the same court which, upon the decision has awarded the complainant woman a 50% share in the appreciation of the marital residence, directed the parties to sell the marital residence at the conclusion of the complainant woman’s period of exclusive occupancy, directed the defendant man to pay the sum of $352.27 per week in child support, and fixed the commencement date of the action as the valuation date for equitable distribution of the married parties’ assets.

It is ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision; and it is further ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the complainant woman a 50% share in the appreciation of the marital residence, by deleting the provision thereof directing the parties to sell the marital residence at the conclusion of the complainant woman’s period of exclusive occupancy, and by deleting the provision thereof directing the defendant man to pay the sum of $352.27 per week in child support; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Suffolk County Supreme Court for further proceedings consistent herewith, and for entry of an amended judgment thereafter; and it is further ordered that pending a recalculation of the defendant man’s child support obligation, he shall continue to pay the sum of $352.27 per week for the support of the subject child.

A New York Custody Lawyer said the defendant man acquired the marital residence prior to the parties’ marriage, using the proceeds of a settlement from a personal injury action. The deed and mortgage were placed and kept solely in his name. Consequently, the marital residence is separate property. The appreciation of, or increase in the value of, separate property is considered separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse. The complainant failed to carry her burden establishing that the marital residence appreciated in value during the parties’ marriage and, if so, that such appreciation was due in part to her efforts. Thus, it was error for the Supreme Court to award the complainant woman a 50% share in the appreciation of the marital residence. Moreover, it was error for the Supreme Court to direct that this separate property be sold. However, the complainant woman is entitled to a credit for her equitable share of the marital funds that were used to pay off the mortgage, which was the defendant man’s separate debt. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Suffolk County Supreme Court for the calculation of that credit.

Published on: October 10, 2013

Court Discusses Property Ownership of Licensee

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Special Proceedings case, petitioners are the owners of the Subject Property. Respondent moved into the Subject Property with her paramour after learning she was pregnant with the subject child. Petitioner’s husband is the biological father. A New York Family Lawyer said the parties acknowledged that there are no custody or child support matters pending.

For almost 7 months, Respondent and the paramour resided together at the Subject Property. Petitioner, who resides in the property adjoining the Subject Property, was aware that respondent had moved into the property with her son. Thereafter, while the paramour was incarcerated, respondent continued to reside in the Subject Property without the co-petitioner. The child was born in February 2008 and has lived in the Subject Property with respondent since birth. Apparently, the paramour and respondent at some point had become engaged, but never married, and according to respondent, the engagement ended in April 2009. Co-petitioner, paramour has since returned to prison and, according to petitioner, it is anticipated that her son will be released in or about January 2010.

It is undisputed that respondent has continued to reside in the Subject Property uninterrupted for a period of more than two (2) years. There was no testimony that petitioner ever resided in the Subject Property. Co-petitioner is listed as the sole borrower on the mortgage for the Subject Property, and according to the credible documentary evidence, the Subject Property is the subject of a foreclosure proceeding pending in Suffolk County Supreme Court. Thereafter, Co-petitioner deeded one-half interest in the Subject Property to petitioner to assist with the mortgage arrears.

Published on: October 9, 2013

Court Discusses Statutory Duties of Law Guardian

by Stephen Bilkis

In this Order of protection case, the Law Guardian was relieved and new counsel assigned to represent the child’s interests. Respondent mother’s counsel asserts that during the fact-finding hearing, while the caseworker for the Administration for Children’s Services was testifying, the Law Guardian read a People/Us magazine under her desk and text messages on her cell phone. In addition, counsel for respondent mother notes that the Law Guardian asked the caseworker no questions during cross-examination. According to counsel for respondent mother, “the last straw” was during an off-the-record bench conference, when the Law Guardian stated her support for the agency’s position. A New York Family Lawyer said at that point, counsel contends that he became very upset, because the Law Guardian appeared to fail to pay attention to the testimony during the trial, yet took a position against his client.

A New York Custody Lawyer said that the motion is opposed by the Law Guardian. She emphatically denies that she was reading a magazine, although she admits that there was one on her desk. She also denies that she was reading text messages asserting, “there is no cell phone service in the court.” The Law Guardian asserts that she has diligently represented her now five-year-old client’s interests. Specifically, she asserts that she met with her client twice, conducted an extensive and thorough investigation and made a determination to advocate for a resolution that she believed to be in the child’s best interests. She asserts that although she did not wish to cross-examine the caseworker, she was paying very close attention and is knowledgeable about all of the facts and circumstances at issue in this case.

Counsel for respondent maternal great-grandmother has submitted an affirmation which essentially supports the observations of respondent mother’s counsel about the Law Guardian’s actions, although he takes no position in support of, or opposition to, the motion. A Nassau County Family Lawyer said after having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court finds the affirmation submitted by respondent mother’s counsel devoid of viable evidence indicating any bias on the part of the Law Guardian, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to diligently represent the child’s interests or other recognized grounds for disqualification. The motion is denied.